



Table 1: Parameters included in the final working model for stage 1

States		Quit Rate	Escalation Rate	Average Dwell Time (years)
Non-injecting states	C: Cannabis only	.091	.076	6.0
	P: Polydrug use (non-injecting)	.088	.052	7.1
Injecting states	L2*: Occasional, no escalation	.149	0	6.7
	L1: Occasional, will escalate	0	.218	4.6
	H: Frequent injecting	.05		20

*NB: "Quit" from L2 includes pure quitting and de-escalation to P

Table 2: Percentages of the flow splits in the final working model for stage 1


Initiation	91%	to C (Cannabis only) state
	9%	to P (Polydrug) state
Escalation to injection use	77%	to L2 (occasional; won't escalate) state
	14%	to L1 (occasional, will escalate) state
	9%	to H (frequent injecting) state
De-escalation from L2	64%	Quit
	36%	De-escalate to P (Polydrug use)

The prevalence of Australian drug use over time

Figure 2 shows the model's outputs in terms of modelling the prevalence of illicit drug use in Australia. As currently configured the model predicts the findings for cannabis-only and non-

injecting use of other illicit drugs evident in the 1998 National Drug Strategy Household Survey within 6%. While the findings in relation to injecting drug use differ widely from the survey findings, this is not surprising given that it is known that this survey dramatically underestimates injecting drug use.

Figure 2: Modelled prevalence of illicit drug use in Australia for the states included in the model



Changing the trajectory of drug use in Australia

One of the key features of the model is that it can be used in policy simulation. To this effect the model can simulate the effects of interventions directly related to model parameters (e.g. increasing quit rates) and trace the impact of this change over time in terms of prevalence and social costs. Figure 3 details the effects of doubling the quit rate from the heavy IDU state in 2005 (e.g. through some new forms of treatment) upon prevalence (3a) and social costs (3b). These figures suggest, on the basis of the modelled results that the effect of such an intervention would be to cap the prevalence of heavy IDU at around 100,000 persons (which was modelled as increasing to 150,000 by 2015 assuming no change in quit rate) with associated annual costs of around \$13,000 (which was modelled as increasing to \$18,000 by 2015 assuming no change in quit rate).



Figure 3a: Modelled changes in IDU prevalence as a result of hypothetical changes in quit rate from heavy IDU state





Figure 3b: Modelled changes in social costs associated with IDU as a result of hypothetical changes in quit rate from heavy IDU state





Implications

The modelling approach taken in this work is feasible using Australian data. The final working model developed for the first phase of DPMP successfully reproduces survey findings from 1998. Further, the model can examine the effects of any posited changes in model parameters that may result from interventions or effects within the drug field. This means that it is especially well-suited to engaging in experiments with policy makers in terms of the way in which they come to understand and value interventions and policy options.

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