TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN ORDER?

THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

by Giuseppe Schiavone

1. Since the old order broke down as a consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet empire and the bipolar world, Europe has been going through an extraordinary change in size, shape and governance. This process of radical transformation is not yet over and, contrary to the beliefs and expectations of some scholars, history has not ended. The emergence of a new order will depend on a host of different factors, often mutually conflicting.

Among these factors, the dual enlargement of the European Union (EU) and NATO will be of paramount importance for its far-reaching consequences not only in the European continent but on a global scale. There is, in fact, a potentially awkward link between the eastward expansion of the EU and that of NATO, with significant repercussions on countries aspiring to join both organizations. Membership of both the EU and NATO represents a powerful magnet for Central and Eastern European countries but involves distinctly different benefits and burdens. In general, it seems safe to maintain that the EU’s enlargement negotiations represent a lengthy and difficult process, far more complex than accession to NATO.

A popular mantra in Europe today is that a more closely integrated EU is the only possible answer to the challenge of globalization and the insecurity that it nurtures throughout the continent. The acceptance of globalization should represent both a historic test of the continent’s ability to survive and prosper and a major opportunity to promote basic European values in the world.

But it should be emphasized from the beginning that the enlargement process, for both the EU and NATO as well as for their respective member countries, is not going to be painless but will involve a radical reappraisal of the mission and structures of the two organizations.

2. It may well be worthwhile, before undertaking an examination of the main features of the emerging European order, to identify the boundaries of the region involved. This was a fairly simple exercise during the cold-war era since Europe was divided into two halves, each one of them with a clear set of loyalties and affiliations. Given its close links with North America and in particular the US with regard to security matters, Western Europe has also been part, during a period stretching over half a century, of a distinctive “North Atlantic” region.

The collapse of the communist system throughout Central and Eastern Europe has paved the way for the gradual emergence of a continent made up of countries basically sharing the same fundamental goals, values and aspirations. While Europe’s strict relationship with North America continues essentially unchanged, the Eastern borders of the continent pose a major challenge. As a matter of fact, for several decades most organizations, although calling themselves “European”, were limited per se to Western European countries. The gradual “return” to the European fold of countries of the former socialist bloc is eventually giving birth to a continent now proudly proclaiming itself “whole and free”.

On the other hand, it should always be kept in mind that Western Europe and Eastern Europe, in several respects, continue to exist as distinct entities and reveal different trends whose implications should not be neglected. In the period immediately following the events of 1989, two different tendencies appeared in the continent: one towards integration in Western Europe (suffice it to mention the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union), and another towards disintegration in Eastern Europe, as shown by the break-up of the USSR and socialist Yugoslavia and the split in Czechoslovakia.

Over the past couple of years, new contrasting trends have been emerging in domestic political life from general elections results. Most Western European countries are moving to the right, while Eastern European ones are moving to the left. Several notions of Europe continue to subsist and the relevant international organizations may comprise as full members countries belonging to other continents, in particular North America and Central Asia. Trans-regional, regional and subregional groupings exist side by side, each with its principles, goals and responsibilities, but with recurrent cases of duplication of efforts and overlap. A brief overview of major European and pan-European institutions will give an idea of their respective role in building up the new European order.

3. In an extremely wide area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - the new name since 1995 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) - represents the largest existing security institution, with a trans-regional perspective and a current membership of 55. Canada and the US have been part of the OSCE from the start. As the main instrument for political and security consultation and co-ordination, the OSCE deals with early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, including long-term missions in troubled areas and supervision of elections and referendums.

As it has been the case for other international institutions after September 11 (or 9/11 as it has now come to be called), the struggle against terrorism has become one of the key objectives of the OSCE and is conducted collectively and at many levels - political, economic, military and diplomatic. This involves an improvement of coordination and information-sharing in order to tackle effectively the problems which terrorism feeds off - in particular trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings, organized crime, money-laundering and persisting regional conflicts and sources of instability.

Another body spanning from Vancouver to Vladivostok is the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), among the oldest regional commissions of the UN. Although not an organization in its own right since it operates within the UN system under the authority of the Economic and Social Council, the UN/ECE has provided an important consultation and cooperation forum especially during the Cold war years. In response to the radical changes in Europe since 1989, the Commission has adjusted its objectives to assisting the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in their transition to a market economy.

The Council of Europe, the continent’s oldest political organization set up in 1949, has been the first regional institution to open its doors to countries formerly belonging to the “socialist” half of the continent, including Russia. The Council, that nearly doubled its membership in the course of the 1990s reaching as far as the Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, has established itself as a guardian of democratic security in Europe and a sort of antechamber to the EU.

NATO is being transformed from a cold-war defensive alliance to protect Western Europe into a guarantor of security throughout the continent, more and more focused on dealing with terrorist threats. The entry into NATO, in March 1999, of three former Warsaw Pact countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, represented a major event but did not bring about a significant change in the outlook and purposes of the organization. In other words, the new members contributed to the expansion of the political influence of NATO but did not increase its military credibility. All in all, NATO at 19 does not appear today strikingly different from NATO at 16.

As regards European integration in the proper sense, it seems to be beyond doubt that the European Communities at the beginning and subsequently the European Union represent a paradigm, both inescapable and unattainable, for all regional cooperation experiences.

The EU is founded on the existing European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of co-operation established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The TEU, signed in Maastricht in February 1992 and entered into force in November 1993, was later amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in October 1997 and entered into force in May 1999. Further amendments were introduced by the Treaty of Nice, signed in February 2001 and still to enter into force.

The TEU has marked the beginning of a decisive stage “in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” through: i) the expansion of the scope of responsibilities of the European Communities; ii) the implementation of a common foreign and security policy; and iii) the development of close co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs.

The basic objectives of the Union have considerably expanded to include, besides the original goals, the achievement of balanced and sustainable development; the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and the establishment of economic and monetary union, with a single currency; the implementation of an EU-wide foreign policy, including a common defence policy; and the introduction of a citizenship of the Union

After the enlargement that occurred in 1995, bringing the membership to 15, a new wave of entrants is expected for the next few years with 10 countries likely to approach the last stages of accession negotiations by the end of this year. An eastward enlargement had already occurred de facto with the incorporation into the EU of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a consequence of its reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in October 1990.

A glance at a membership table of major European organizations shows a variety of “Europes”: the “trans-regional” Europe of the OSCE and of UN/ECE with 55 members each; the “European” Europe of the Council of Europe with 44 members; the “North Atlantic” Europe of NATO with 19 members; and the 15-member EU. For the sake of comprehensiveness, mention should also be made of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) now remaining with only four members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) since most of its founder countries have joined the EU, and of the Western European Union (WEU) that practically ceased to exist by mid-2001 with most of its responsibilities transferred to the EU.

Which kind of Europe will result from the enlargement of the EU? Will the 44-member Council of Europe represent a credible option for the future of the EU? Should the EU follow in the footsteps of even larger organizations such as the OSCE? Should we concentrate instead on a “core” Europe including a limited number of countries acting as a locomotive pulling slower partners? Or should we stop asking too many questions about the future shape of the continent? Perhaps we should not become obsessed with the thought of the future and the heritage we are going to pass on to the succeeding generations.

4. While “old” organizations are striving to find a fresh raison d’être to cope with the challenges of a transformed European architecture, new subregional bodies, mainly focused on specific issues and with highly flexible institutional structures, are being established. In a class of its own, comprising the former constituent republics of the USSR with the exception of the three Baltic countries, stands the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) created, in the early 1990s, as a framework for promoting co-operation in a variety of fields. Among the most relevant agencies on the northern and southern borders of Europe, mention can be made of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) set up in 1992, the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) also inaugurated in 1992, and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, launched in 1993.

In the heart of Europe, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the Central European Initiative (CEI) are significant examples of the efforts to implement trade and economic liberalization measures and to coordinate the policies of member countries vis-à-vis major European and global international organizations. The GUUAM Group - a political, economic and strategic alliance among five former Soviet republics in Europe and Asia (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Moldova) formally established in 2001 - is among the most recent additions to the growing panoply of subregional bodies.

The independence of the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union has encouraged the formation of closer political and economic links with their southern neighbours. The five republics plus Armenia and Afghanistan joined in 1992 the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO), which had been set up in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as a successor to the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).

Other significant developments are taking place in Central Asia where the “Shanghai Five” group of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan set up in 1996 was transformed in 2001, with the addition of Uzbekistan, into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO, formally endowed in June of this year with a Charter and based in Beijing, is on its way to becoming a full-fledged international organization focused on fighting “terrorism, extremism and separatism” and maintaining stability in an extremely vast and increasingly turbulent area.

5. A strong institutional framework with “supranational” features characterized from the very beginning the experience of the European Communities. The 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was based on an elaborate legal framework and the formal transfer of a number of competences from participating states to common institutions, including a Parliament and a Court of Justice. Both the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom Treaties, in 1957, followed the ECSC path providing for powerful institutions and the adoption of legally binding rules, thus giving birth to organizations of a new kind enriching the classical intergovernmental dimension with peculiar “supranational” attributes.

After the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), both the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty represented crucial attempts at upgrading and speeding up the integration process, making the EU experience quite unique from the institutional standpoint. The political and economic homogeneity of the founder countries and their long-term goal of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe represented the foundation on which to erect robust institutional machinery.

According to most analysts and students of European integration, enlargement is the challenge facing the EU over the next decade or so. The official requests for membership addressed by 13 countries, likely to be joined by a number of other candidates especially from the Balkans, bear witness to the success of the EU experience. Official candidates are the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, plus the two island states of Cyprus and Malta; Turkey is a candidate but accession negotiations have not started yet. Other prospective candidates, most of them in southeastern Europe, might be Belarus, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine and possibly Russia.

Expectations of a stable and prosperous EU of up to 28 members and a total population of 544 million (9 per cent of world total), basically sharing the same values and the same economic and social model, seem to clash with concerns about the future of a regional organization losing its identity and sense of direction and unsure of its borders.

As a matter of fact, the forthcoming expansion cannot and should not be considered as the continuation, on a greater scale, of the experiences that the European Communities had with previous enlargements. This is a qualitatively new phenomenon that is not merely widening but thoroughly transforming the present EU. Between 1973 and 1995, enlargements involved a gradual stretching of EU institutions to accommodate new member countries without altering neither the members’ basic entitlements to seats in the different institutions nor the key features of the decision-making process. If that procedure were automatically replicated in the case of the eastward expansion, not only the efficiency but also ultimately the very existence of the EU would be jeopardized.

It need not be stressed that the driving force behind European integration has been political and that the “founding fathers” of Europe started a process that made use of economic tools to attain essentially political ends. In the 1990s, with the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, fundamental principles have further expanded to incorporate liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights (including fundamental social rights of workers), considered not only as prerequisites for countries aspiring to join the EU but also as conditions for outsiders in order to obtain development aid.

Human rights were written for the first time into a EU treaty in 1992. The legal basis is provided by the TEU whose Article 11, para. 1, indicates among the objectives of the common foreign and security policy, the development and consolidation of “democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.

On the monetary side, the introduction of the euro as a common currency for 12 member countries in January 2002 is a powerful symbol of European identity.

6. The forthcoming enlargement has intensified the growing pains of the EU. At the Laeken European Council, on December 14 and 15, 2001, the heads of state and government decided to set up a Convention whose deliberations should help bridge the gap between the EU and its citizens and make the EU itself more democratic, transparent and efficient. The Convention was inaugurated at the end of last February and is expected to last about a year; it meets in Brussels and uses the 11 working languages of the EU. The European Council has appointed the former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as Chairman of the Convention and Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene as Vice-Chairmen.

In addition to its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, the Convention is composed of 15 representatives of the heads of state or government of the member countries (one from each country), 30 members of national parliaments (two from each member country), 16 members of the European Parliament and two Commission representatives. The accession candidate countries are fully involved in the Convention’s proceedings. In total, there are 105 members of the Convention - delegates from national parliaments and the European Parliament, representatives of the governments of the 15 member countries and emissaries of the 13 candidate countries. In all, about two-thirds of the members of the Convention are parliamentarians. A Forum has been opened for organisations representing civil society (the social partners, the business world, non-governmental organisations, academia, etc.).

The Convention Chairman will give an oral progress report at each European Council meeting, thus enabling heads of state or government to give their views at the same time.

The Convention will consider the various issues and draw up a final document which may comprise either different options, indicating the degree of support which they received, or recommendations if consensus is achieved. In other words, the outcome of the Convention may widely vary from a series of modest proposals to a single, bold strategic plan on the table of the IGC of 2004 that is entitled to take the ultimate decisions.

7. As regards NATO, a further enlargement is expected to take place later this year, strengthening the eastward expansion of the Alliance and changing the balance of power in the continent. At the Prague summit next November, NATO will review the progress of the nine formal aspirants - the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, two republics of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia and FYROM) and Albania – and decide on their eventual admission.

This process will inevitably entail a wide-ranging review of the mission, machinery and military capabilities of the organization. The NATO command structure will probably be transformed from fixed, regional commands to mobile headquarters forces, with growing emphasis on the struggle against terrorism and a greater focus on meeting capability shortfalls. The present two commanders, one for Europe and the other for the Atlantic area, should be replaced by commands based on functions, especially now that NATO is increasingly considering “out-of-area” operations and pre-emptive action in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Membership of Baltic countries represents a special challenge for Russia, especially policy circles and the military establishment that have already had to accept the permanent deployment of European and US forces in former Soviet Central Asia in the struggle against terrorism.

The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad (once called Königsberg and known as Immanuel Kant’s birthplace) on the Baltic Sea, between Lithuania and Poland, with a population of about one million, poses a delicate problem. In the near future, transit from Russia to the enclave will be across or over NATO and EU territory. In fact, the economic and political issues concerning Kaliningrad probably overshadow the strictly military aspects.

The essential question regards the present and, above all, the future relevance of NATO. Since 9/11, the US has apparently decided that the mission determines the coalition and not vice versa, clearly moving toward a context of “coalitions à la carte” and avoiding the cumbersome decision-making processes that are a distinct feature of NATO. It is well known that, on September 12, European partners invoked Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and its mutual defence clause in order to demonstrate their solidarity with the US. It is important to emphasize that it remains the right of each NATO member to decide for itself what action it should take in all the circumstances. The attack envisaged by those who drafted the Treaty was obviously an attack by a foreign power across an international border and not an attack organized from within a state. As a matter of fact, Europeans, owing to their limited defence budgets, do not have much to offer with the exception of access to airspace and bases and special forces. But, by declaring that the attack of 9/11 was an attack against them all, NATO’s European members expressed their political support. To misquote Winston Churchill, the Old World came to support the New.

New targets have been identified by the US in the war against terrorism, including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Any military operation against these countries, however, is likely to be opposed by several NATO countries and by Russia.

The recent developments of the NATO-Russia relationship will undoubtedly contribute to shaping the new European order. President Putin has repeated Russian support for the US and has emphasized his country’s commitment to fighting terrorism. It is also important to stress Russia’s full membership of the Group of Eight (G-8) as a result of the summit held in Canada last June.

An important NATO-Russia summit was held at the Pratica di Mare Air Force Base near Rome on May 28, 2002. The summit decided to replace the former Permanent Joint Council by the NATO-Russia Council, a stronger mechanism for consultation and cooperation aimed at bringing relations between NATO and Russia to a qualitatively higher level. It may be interesting to mention the fact that, at the summit, Mr Putin was seated between the leaders of Portugal and Spain, in alphabetical order by country.

The newly created Council, chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO, will deal with a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. It will meet at the level of foreign ministers and at the level of defence ministers twice a year, and at the level of heads of state and government as appropriate.

On May 24, just a few days before the NATO-Russia summit, the US and Russia had signed a treaty in Moscow involving deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces, with each party reducing by two-thirds its strategic weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 2012.

8. It has become increasingly apparent to most Europeans that a new order on the continent will depend primarily on the ability of the EU to reform itself and rise to the great occasion of enlargement without resorting to a myopic protection of vested interests. As a matter of fact, the enlargement is too often viewed by EU politicians as a zero-sum game. In other words, any concession made to candidate countries would ultimately amount to something subtracted from their own citizens.

According to the Laeken declaration, the EU needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient in order to bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the European grand design and the European institutions, and to develop the enlarged EU into a stabilising factor and a model in the new, multipolar world.

It is the task of the Convention currently meeting in Brussels to deal with these challenges and to find a solution to at least some of the issues at stake. I would say that a cautious optimism is de rigueur to avoid falling into the trap of unrealistic expectations.

A major prerequisite for a truly democratic and transparent EU is represented by a better definition and even a reorganization of competence between the EU itself on the one hand and the member countries on the other. European citizens are quite often under the impression that “eurocrats” in Brussels deal with a number of areas that should be left to the competence of member countries, at the national or even local level.

Several EU-wide policies also badly need a reassessment, from the common foreign and defence policy to a more integrated approach to police and criminal law cooperation. On the other hand, new policy areas may be considered for an expanded and more ambitious EU.

The role of institutional mechanisms is crucial for the future of the EU since the European project as a whole derives its legitimacy from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions. Each of the three major institutions faces its own peculiar kind of challenges in the battle that is going on over who should run the EU. The gradual strengthening of the intergovernmental component has generated a new political environment in which not only the Commission but also the European Parliament as well as national parliaments seem destined to play a more limited role.

The role of the European Parliament may be decisive for the future of the EU. The Parliament has been gaining over the past decades an increasing power, especially with regard to the so-called co-decision procedure with the Council. Proposals have been put forward for the creation of a European electoral constituency to replace the present constituencies that are established on a national basis. Another significant issue to be dealt with is represented by the relationship between the European Parliament and national parliaments. It has been suggested that national parliaments should be represented in a new institution, alongside the European Parliament and the Council.

The European Commission, its authority and efficiency are under close scrutiny. President Prodi has put forward important proposals to strengthen the Commission’s role and give it more competences in several sensitive issues from defence to home affairs. However, we should take into account the decline of the political influence of the Commission since the end of the “Delors era” and the crisis of the Paris-Bonn axis that has failed to materialize in a new Paris-Berlin axis. On no account should the roles played by France and Germany be underestimated, even if all member countries are supposed to be equal.

Smaller countries clearly favour a strong Commission that would best protect their interests. Larger countries would like the Council of Ministers to be given more powers with the Commission confined to servicing the Council. Let me just refer to recent British and French proposals for the creation of a new high-profile post, that is a Council president, serving a five-year term, to give the EU political direction and represent it on the world stage. According to these proposals, the president would be elected by national leaders; other plans favour a direct election by European citizens. The appointment of a Council president would thus abolish the present six-monthly rotation of the Presidency of the Union.

As regards the reorganization of the Treaties on which the EU is based, a solution could be represented by the introduction of a distinction between a basic treaty of constitutional rank (and therefore to be submitted to the present cumbersome amendment and ratification procedures) and the other treaty provisions that could be modified more easily.

9. The thought of a possible reorganization of the European Treaties has almost naturally led to proposals for the drafting of some sort of Constitution incorporating basic principles and values of the EU. This looms as a big question for many participants in the ongoing Convention.

The existence of common values actually provided both the basis and the momentum for integration and has been the starting point for cooperation within the pan-European and transatlantic frameworks. This is certainly the case for the Council of Europe, the EU and NATO, as repeatedly stressed in official documents over the past half-century. The Charter of Fundamental Human Rights proclaimed at the European Council in Nice, on 7 December 2000, although without legal value for the time being, bears witness to the importance of these shared values. The reference to common European values also appears in the Laeken Declaration of the European Council stating that the EU “is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law”. According to several leaders of Christian Churches, and especially Pope John Paul II, these basic values should also incorporate those spiritual and religious elements that are quintessentially European. It may well be that Europe needs a “soul” even more urgently than a formal Constitution.

Although it is clear that Brussels 2002 is not Philadelphia 1787, at the heart of the debate are some of the same challenges that the Americans faced in 1787. In Philadelphia, 55 white men, delegates from 12 of the 13 newly-independent colonies, met in secrecy for an entire summer. No women, no African Americans and no Native Americans were present. And yet the EU Convention shares one thing with Philadelphia 1787, the fact of being a great initiator of change, looking for a formula that will allow for an ambitious expansion of its borders.

With respect to the forthcoming enlargement, a tight timetable has been set in Denmark’s programme for the EU’s rotating presidency, from July 31 to December 31 of this year. Enlargement negotiations should be completed in Copenhagen at the European Council summit meeting scheduled to start of December 12 and to last for a couple of days. The enlargement progress started in earnest in Copenhagen in 1993 and Denmark plans to conclude it by the end of this year. But negotiations will have to wait for the general elections in Germany at the end of September. A new German government should be fully established by next October, thus leaving only a few weeks for full conclusive negotiations.

Disputes over farm and regional subsidies and the possibility that the Irish may reject the Treaty of Nice for a second time are among major obstacles to the successful completion of accession negotiations. Any delay in enlargement would threaten the credibility of the promises made by EU countries to bring Central and Eastern European countries into the Union. But Denmark has also warned candidate countries not to count on possible delays of enlargement negotiations. Membership negotiations not completed by next December could be delayed for several years and not merely months. The next round of enlargement is due to take place in 2007. The accession treaties should be ready for ratification by the European Parliament three months after the conclusion of negotiations in December. The whole ratification process should be completed in time for candidate countries to participate as full EU members in the European Parliament elections due to take place in June 2004.

10. Although the momentum of the enlargement process seems sufficiently strong for the time being, doubts persist in existing members and there is growing discontent in candidate countries. We have now reached the point where the continent’s politics are in their greatest flux for years.

The assumption in Brussels has been that the biggest political problems over enlargement would originate from inside the existing Union. The drift to the right in European politics as shown by recent elections with the success of nationalist and populist parties could cast increasing doubts over the EU’s commitment to enlargement. National governments appear less likely to agree to moves towards a more integrated EU. If the winds of change continue to blow, it is most likely that the majority of EU members will have centre-right governments before the end of this year, with the major exceptions of Britain and Sweden. Anti-immigration parties have entered government coalitions in a number of countries. Over the past couple of years, parties of the right have won elections in Austria, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, and also in a non-EU country such as Norway. French elections held last June resulted in an overwhelming victory for the right, the humbling of the Socialists and the “plural left” (gauche plurielle, as they say in France) and the downfall of extremists of both right and left.

According to opinion polls, the centre-right has a comfortable lead in Germany where elections are scheduled to take place on September 22 and in Greece where elections will be held in 2003. Attempts by the ruling coalition to make Germany’s right-wing candidate appear as a sort of a populist have clearly failed and Mr. Stoiber appears to many as a credible middle-of-the-road moderate.

Are we in presence of a sea-change in European politics and policies? The shift to the right should be considered along another significant phenomenon, that is the growing abstention rate throughout the continent (around 40 per cent in the concluding phase of French general elections). The high abstention rate bears witness to the deep apathy and dissatisfaction of ordinary people with the way their respective countries are ruled and also, to some extent, with Brussels bureaucrats. The growing disenchantment among the electorates of EU member countries probably reflects the inability of mainstream parties to understand the manifold implications of the end of the cold war.

Another characteristic to be taken into account is that in Western Europe the traditional dividing lines between left and right and their respective and reassuring certainties have become increasingly blurred.

The tilt to the right in the western half of the continent has not been accompanied by similar developments in Central and Eastern Europe. After the centre-left victory in Poland in the autumn of 2001, the same general trend has been confirmed in other candidate countries, notably Hungary (where the rightwing conservative party lost the general elections on 21 April), and the Czech Republic last June. General elections are due to take place in Slovakia next autumn.

The global economic slowdown and protectionism of various kinds in the EU have not improved the atmosphere. The Sudetenland dispute is a case in point. Under the so-called Benes Decrees in Czechoslovakia, 2.5 million Germans and several tens of thousands Hungarians were deported. Both Austria and Hungary have asked for the annulment of the Benes Decrees. In fact, both the ruling coalitions and the opposition parties face a hard choice: if they respond weakly, they are going to lose the support of nationalist and populist forces frightened by globalization; if they overreact, they risk alienating the moderate part of public opinion. Central and Eastern European countries are still full of resentment and bitterness rooted in the past.

One of the thorniest issues on the negotiators’ agenda is agriculture, especially in Poland where over 2 million people are employed in farming. The European Commission has proposed starting subsidies to farmers in candidate countries at 25 per cent of EU levels and phasing increases over 10 years. Nearly all candidates have rejected this proposal.

There is the political question of Cyprus, a thorn in the side of Europe. The island is still divided between the Turkish Cypriot north and the Greek Cypriot south, only the latter being ruled by an internationally recognized government. The already-mentioned status of Kaliningrad, the Baltic port acquired in 1945 by Russia that will be completely surrounded by EU members after enlargement. The question of Gypsies, discriminated in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania and facing travel restrictions in the territory of the EU.

Last but not least, the demands from former owners (including well-organized Jewish groups) of property expropriated by Nazis and Communists. A general restitution law has been passed by Central and Eastern European countries, Poland being the most significant exception.

11. A new, pro-growth political environment in Europe might engender a sustained dollar decline and permit the US to reduce its current account deficit without resorting to new forms of protectionism. Increased tensions caused by uncurbed immigration from former communist and developing countries, the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers especially from the Balkans, high unemployment, rising of organized crime and drug-smuggling, widening income disparities and ageing populations are likely to affect to some extent the social fabric of many countries. The parties of the left have often denied the magnitude of the problems caused to the everyday life of the ordinary citizen by illegal immigration and this “denial syndrome” has contributed to strengthening xenophobic attitudes among public opinion.

The fight against illegal immigration is closely connected with progress on the common asylum policy. The need for a definition of an EU-wide asylum and immigration policy was stressed at the European Council held in Tampere, Finland, in October 1999. The success throughout Europe of anti-immigration parties is making the task even more difficult, although some measures concerning the common asylum and immigration policy have already been agreed upon. These measures include the so-called Eurodac system, that is a Europe-wide fingerprint database for asylum-seekers, a directive offering temporary protection to mass influxes of immigrants and a directive on minimum standards for the acceptance of asylum-seekers.

Proposals are being discussed for the adoption of a single definition of asylum-seeker, common procedures for handling asylum requests, the definition of common standards and timescales for granting and withdrawing refugee status. This would be of special relevance in ending the so-called asylum shopping, since refugees more often than not are try to find the country which takes the longest to process their request. Furthermore, commitment to fight against illegal immigration and people trafficking could become an integral part of the negotiation by the EU of future agreements with developing countries; some form of “sanctions” might be applied against source countries unwilling to cooperate.

A new law to control immigration has just been approved by Italy’s parliament. Legal immigrants will be required, inter alia, to have job contracts before leaving their home countries. Small and medium firms in northern Italy and farms in the south depend on immigrants, legal as well as illegal. Both categories of immigrants from non-EU countries will have to be fingerprinted. According to some sources, a system could eventually be devised to exempt Americans, Australians and Canadians from this procedure.

11. The problems of the relationship with Russia that have already been mentioned in the context of NATO loom no less important for the EU itself. At the ninth EU-Russia summit on May 29, 2002, the importance of the strategic partnership between the two parties has been reaffirmed on the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The EU declared its intention to modify its legislation to grant Russia full market economy status. Once more there is an urgent need to find mutually acceptable solutions for the Kaliningrad region (movement of people and goods, challenges posed by crime, improvement of environmental protection). The creation of the new Russia-NATO Council is considered as a major positive step in strengthening comprehensive security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

An important area regards energy and an EU-Russia Energy Dialogue has been established in October 2000 with a view to developing a full EU-Russia Energy Partnership. Russia is currently the world’s third biggest oil producer and the second biggest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia and a major supplier of energy for the EU. About 20 per cent of total net EU oil imports and about 40 per cent of EU gas imports come from Russia. Energy and fuels accounted for over 60 per cent of Russian exports to the EU in the year 2000. These simple data show how vital is the interest of the EU in maintaining Russia’s role as a major supplier of oil and gas and developing the Russian energy infrastructure. The US too is interested in promoting investment in the Russian oil and gas industry and, of course, Russian exports. Just in time for the Fourth of July, the first ever super tanker of crude oil from Russia docked in the port of Houston, Texas. Exports of Russian oil could effectively curb Opec’s ability to manipulate prices.

12. There is no doubt that the future of the EU is the future of Europe. The various proposals that are being put forward set out the battle-lines for the debate on the shape of the new European order that is gradually emerging. What will Europe ultimately become: a continent-wide super-state, a United States of Europe, or more likely a United Europe of States?

Whatever the outcome of the Convention, it may be safely assumed that no European “super-state” is in sight. This will be extremely disappointing for two classes of people: those who are strongly in favour of the creation of a full-fledged federal Europe and the nationalists and populists who need the old bogey of a super-state to preach against the cause of European integration.

The question mark originally put at the end of the first line of the title of this talk: “Towards a New European Order” still hangs over the future of Europe. Nonetheless, I hope that at least some of you will feel they have not completely wasted their time listening to me. The task was very difficult indeed. Let me conclude by reminding you of what Sam Goldwyn, the film producer of M-G-M fame used to say: “Never make forecasts, especially about the future”.